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The ontogenesis of narrative: from
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1 Early Years, School of Education, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow, UK,
2 School of Philosophy, Psychology and Language Sciences, College of Humanities and Social Sciences, The University of
Edinburgh, UK
Narrative, the creation of imaginative projects and experiences displayed in expressions
of movement and voice, is how human cooperative understanding grows. Human
understanding places the character and qualities of objects and events of interest within
stories that portray intentions, feelings, and ambitions, and how one cares about them.
Understanding the development of narrative is therefore essential for understanding
the development of human intelligence, but its early origins are obscure. We identify
the origins of narrative in the innate sensorimotor intelligence of a hypermobile human
body and trace the ontogenesis of narrative form from its earliest expression in
movement. Intelligent planning, with self-awareness, is evident in the gestures and
motor expressions of the mid-gestation fetus. After birth, single intentions become
serially organized into projects with increasingly ambitious distal goals and social
meaning. The infant imitates others’ actions in shared tasks, learns conventional
cultural practices, and adapts his own inventions, then names topics of interest.
Through every stage, in simple intentions of fetal movement, in social imitations of
the neonate, in early proto-conversations and collaborative play of infants and talk of
children and adults, the narrative form of creative agency with it four-part structure of
‘introduction,’ ‘development,’ ‘climax,’ and ‘resolution’ is present. We conclude that
shared rituals of culture and practical techniques develop from a fundamental psycho-
motor structure with its basic, vital impulses for action and generative process of
thought-in-action that express an integrated, imaginative, and sociable Self. This basic
structure is evident before birth and invariant in form throughout life. Serial organization
of single, non-verbal actions into complex projects of expressive and explorative sense-
making become conventional meanings and explanations with propositional narrative
power. Understanding the root of narrative in embodied meaning-making in this way is
important for practical work in therapy and education, and for advancing philosophy and
neuroscience.
Keywords: narrative, motor origins, ontogenesis, embodied meaning-making, intersubjectivity theory,
communication, intentionality
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Introduction: The Primary Motives for
Stories of Common Sense
“It were easy to show, that the fine arts of themusician, the painter,
the actor, and the orator, so far as they are expressive... are nothing
else but the language of nature, which we brought into the world
with us, but have unlearned by disuse and so find the greatest
difficulty in recovering it. . . . That without a natural knowledge
of the connection between these (natural) signs and the things
signified by them, language could never have been invented and
established among men; and, that the fine arts are all founded
upon this connection, which we may call the natural language of
mankind. . . . It is by natural signs chiefly that we give force and
energy to language; and the less language has of them, it is the less
expressive and persuasive.”
(Reid, 1764/1997, p. 53, 59, 106–107).
“Narrative structure is even inherent in the praxis of social
interaction before it achieves linguistic expression.”
(Bruner, 1990, p. 77)
The Human Impulse for Meaning, and its Early
Cultivation
Young children, in their families, before school, show how
our stories of life begin in artful invention (Bullowa, 1979;
Trevarthen and Delafield-Butt, 2015). They grasp knowledge
purposefully and creatively, encouraged by the convivial
imagination of parents, family, and friends (Donaldson, 1978;
Halliday, 1978; Bruner, 1996; Rogoff, 2003; Legerstee, 2005;
Reddy, 2008, 2012; Mazokopaki and Kugiumutzakis, 2009; Frank
and Trevarthen, 2012; Trevarthen, 2013; Trevarthen et al.,
2014). The meaning of their natural ‘common sense’ grows with
an intuitive ‘logic of action and interaction’ (Lashley, 1951).
Events invented or recalled are shared in the dramatic time-
based performances that give rise to film, theater, music, and
dance (Turner, 1982; Bjørkvold, 1992; Dissanayake, 2000; Stern,
2000; Gratier and Trevarthen, 2008; Malloch and Trevarthen,
2009).
This human imagination of a young child has a further
ambition to identify life events out of the present time of
action, learning how to refer to them in abstract, symbolic
terms (Donaldson, 1992; Osborne, 2009). A scientific focus on
this cognitive abstraction of meaning, and especially on the
record of experience in text, attracts attention away from the
present moment into a timeless world of ideas (Brandt, 2009).
But our intelligence grows in shared story-making. As we learn
words and how to use them in syntactic series to tell stories
of imaginary agents, the meaning is always in terms of the
motivations of these characters within their present world, the
effects of their movements on other objects and persons, and
ultimately the lasting, vital result or ‘fate’ of those concerned
(Bruner, 2002).
The impulses of even the most sophisticated narrative derive
from the common ‘vitality dynamics’ of play in infancy (Stern,
2010), with characteristic phases of arousal and moments
of focussed intensity (Amighi et al., 1999; Damasio, 1999;
Trevarthen et al., 2011; Trevarthen and Delafield-Butt, 2013a),
giving feeling to perceptions of outer things by projection of
symptoms of inner autonomic activity – heart rate changes,
breathing, flight-or-fight response, all displayed and shared in
specially adapted expressive movements to convey felt meaning
in ‘natural language’ (Porges, 1997; Porges and Furman, 2011).
Within these dynamic emotional events, relations between
objects and participants, their properties, motivation and
character, can become placed and named in ‘artificial,’ learned and
conventional language.
Narrative consciousness, with its cognitive content, rather
than conceived as a product of conceptual verbal thinking, can
be defined as the organizing life principle of human cognition
(Bruner, 1990) animated by a primary emotional consciousness
(Panksepp, 2005) in social events of meaning-making (De Jaegher
et al., 2010). It is by making and telling affected stories that we
represent the importance to ourselves of other persons’ presence
and actions, the properties of objects, how persons and objects
relate to each other, and to one’s own well-being in awareness
of activity. The assumptions, understandings, and knowledge of
science, law, politics, history, and religion all depend on the
developmental construction, co-construction, and re-telling of
narratives, with or without words (Halliday, 1975, 1978; Bråten,
2009).
Notwithstanding the evident truth of the powers of human
imagination and their sharing made in movement, it is not clear,
in the science of language development, how these narratives of
meaning-making, ubiquitous in human life and its intelligence,
first appear in development (Cobley, 2014, p. 1–27). Their
ontogenesis before the development of words and language
remain largely unknown (Dautenhahn, 2002). Understanding the
psychobiological source of living narrative requires information
concerning the creation of the intelligence of an integrated,
affectively conscious agent capable of anticipating the outcomes
of processes of movement, and their vital importance (Turner,
1996).
In this paper, we trace the origins of narrative meaning-
making back to the earliest explorations of action by the human
fetus, in utero. We note how impulses for making sense of
the body in its world develop and learn, both before and after
birth in solitary and in social engagements, and how they
become elaborated in more complex compositions (Pezzulo,
2011; Delafield-Butt and Gangopadhyay, 2013). Individual
projects are generated and shared in intersubjective episodes
that make up the collaborative narratives of sound and gesture
in pre-verbal proto-conversations (Bateson, 1979; Gratier and
Trevarthen, 2008; Trevarthen and Delafield-Butt, 2013a). Later
with articulate language, conversation develops with signs and
symbols to represent events, feelings, intentions, and objects. So
the stories become more specialized and defined (Delafield-Butt
and Trevarthen, 2013).
The Animation of a Narrative
At all stages of a life of learning, from the playful displays
of conviviality of early childhood to the development of
sophisticated works of art, philosophy, or science, narrative
activities are generated and sequenced in a chronobiology of
‘vital time’ (Trevarthen, 2008, 2015; Osborne, 2009; Stern, 2010).
There is a remarkable consistency in the performance and
emotional regulation of narratives in development at every
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stage: in simple self-produced intentions of fetal movement, in
intersubjective inventions of imitation with a neonate, in early
proto-conversations and collaborative play of older infants, in
inventive talk of toddlers and adults, and in effective practice
of teaching. Each episode of creative agency, or story, exhibits
four states of arousal that regulate the flow of interest and the
pleasure of engagement. These are: ‘introduction,’ ‘development,’
‘climax,’ and ‘resolution.’ To explain this we must turn attention
to the processes that generate and regulate animal movements
with prospective sensory control.
Purpose and Feeling in Movement
Animal movements are unlike the motions of inanimate objects,
because they are self-generated and purposeful, guided by
an anticipation of specific sensual consequences by selective
orientation of receptors and aimed actions. This primary
consciousness, or ‘with-knowing-ness,’ is generated as muscle
action, which is controlled by proprioception or self-sensing
through measures of time by an integrative nervous system
(Sherrington, 1906; Bernstein, 1967; Llinás, 2001; Buzsáki, 2006;
Panksepp, 2011). The execution of a simple act, such as a reach-
to-touch an object, or a turn of the head and eyes to fixate a point
with sight, is prospectively organized by concerted and precisely
sequenced action of many muscles moving several body parts
with anticipation of a particular pattern of sensory consequences.
It is intentional, and goal-directed (Trevarthen, 1978; von
Hofsten, 2007; Lee, 2009; Delafield-Butt and Gangopadhyay,
2013). It exhibits initiation toward the goal, progression with fast
rhythmic timing of corrective maneuvers keeping the movement
on track, and final climactic contact with its object, as a unit
of meaning-making that tests and confirms a knowledge of
expectations. When completed, the organism has placed itself in
a new set of relations with its environment, and can prepare to
exploit awareness of this, together with its past that is now held in
memory, for the next project. There exists a simple intelligence
within animal movement, a basic motor logic that strives to
preserve and expand the vitality of the organism in its relations
with its perceived objectives.
All self-generated animal movements, even the simplest
and most primitive, are future-oriented. Their muscle activity
conforms to a coordinating ‘motor image’ or ‘schema’ of purpose
(Bernstein, 1967; Jeannerod, 1988; Lee, 2009). ‘Unconditioned’
reflex reactions to stimuli only occur in emergency, for immediate
correction of aim, or for defense and escape. The impulse to
move is planned with adaptation to sustain or benefit the vitality
of the integrated self-conscious organism (Goodrich, 2010),
and this becomes the foundation for acts-of-meaning in social
communication, cooperative action, and the building of affective
relations (Sebeok, 1972, 1994; Trevarthen, 1978, 1986a). In a
well-conceived sequence of acts, an ultimate goal determines the
pattern of the whole project by distributed control of a hierarchy
of movements (Lashley, 1951; Jeannerod, 1988), awareness of
which may be transmitted to others who are observers, or an
audience, as a moving story.
The first intentional consciousness in animal life may be
regarded as pre-conceptual and pre-reflective, without separation
into a cognitive representation of an outer reality (Delafield-Butt
and Gangopadhyay, 2013). These basic purposes, or ‘intentions-
in-action’ (Searle, 1983), are evaluated by inner reference to
states of ‘primary affective consciousness’ located in brainstem
integrative systems, which do not require a functioning cerebral
cortex (Panksepp, 2011; Panksepp and Biven, 2012; Solms and
Panksepp, 2012). Their actions, with perceptual information
and records of detail in memory transmitted from the cerebral
neocortex, are integrated with precision by the time-keeping
powers of the cerebellum responsible for whole-body cognition
(Koziol et al., 2013; Llinás and Negrello, 2015). This theory of
the psychobiology of animal agency constitutes a drastic revision
of the priority that the theory of cognitive neuroscience has
generally given to cortical discriminations and their articulation
in language, affirming that the brainstem, while anatomically
sub-cortical is functionally supra-cortical (Merker, 2007).
A brainstem-based consciousness that is perceptive, affective,
and anticipating future contingencies of intentional action in a
whole-body-related action-space is developed in infant humans
as an adaptable mental agency that is intelligent, purposive,
and a generator of meaning (Baldwin, 1895; Piaget, 1953,
1954). “Human language and thought can be regarded as. . .
deriving from neuroanatomical systems that generate overt
motor responses to environmental challenges and opportunities”
(Lieberman, 2002, p. 158), the basis of which are brainstem
sensorimotor and affective integrative systems (Merker, 2007;
Panksepp and Biven, 2012).
Development of Human Intelligence and
Common Sense
The first pre-reflexive, pre-conceptual acts of ‘meaning-making’
of a human person develop from the spontaneous, self-generated
‘writhing’ movements of the integrated organism evident in
the seventh week of gestation, when the embryo is only 2 cm
in length (Lüchinger et al., 2008; Einspieler et al., 2012). By
8 weeks of gestation, displacements of the limbs and thorax with
partial rotations of the head are produced in well-formed ‘general
movements,’ but are not yet discrete, nor focussed on external
goals (de Vries et al., 1984; Lüchinger et al., 2008; Piontelli,
2010). But by 10 weeks gestational age, fetal arm movements
become differentiated from general body movement and hand
movements are directed to parts of the body, especially to the
face and head (Piontelli, 2010), giving the first indication of a
motivation for developing a primary awareness of the Self.
Purposeful actions with the whole body or by separate actions
of parts, such as the hands, develop in the second trimester
(Zoia et al., 2007, 2013; Piontelli, 2010). These actions depend
on both an internal proprioceptive sense of the body in motion
and on ex-proprioceptive touch picking up information of
changing relations with external objects, such as the wall of
the mother’s uterus, or the body of a twin (Castiello et al.,
2010), or from hearing the mother’s voice (DeCasper and Spence,
1986). These early intentional acts motivate an extension of the
imaginative use of the body into the future, guided by prospective
perceptual awareness which is beginning to inform a memory
of consequences (Trevarthen, 1984; Jeannerod, 2006; Reissland
et al., 2013a). Movements are assembled into more purposeful
complexes, such as bicycling the legs against the uterine wall
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coincident with a trunk rotation, causing the fetus to turn over,
or a reach and grasp directed to the umbilical cord (Piontelli,
2010).
Recent studies with four-dimensional ultrasound find not
only that facial movements made in the last trimester of fetal
life may be organized to express displeasure or smiles of
enjoyment in affective responses to different stimuli, but that
mouth movements show adaptations toward both execution of
speech movements and imitative ‘mirroring’ of sounds of speech
(Reissland et al., 2011, 2013b). The expressive movements of
both kinds, as well as self-touching movements of the hands,
show asymmetries that can be related to the cerebral asymmetries
of neocortical function that develop in early childhood, and
that become particularly important for the learning of language
(Reissland et al., 2014, Reissland et al., 2015).
After birth this conscious human agency seeks not only to
discover further knowledge generated through forms of activity
of the Self, as Piaget (1953, 1954) described, but to share
vitality in what comes to be identified in adult meaning-making
as ‘narrative’ in language, regulated by conceptions of Self-
Other consciousness (Legerstee, 2005). The appetite for sharing
a narrative is clearly demonstrated by the powers of infants
to both imitate expressive movements and collaborate in their
sequencing to ‘tell a story,’ even within hours of birth (Trevarthen
and Delafield-Butt, 2013a, 2015; Kugiumutzakis and Trevarthen,
2015).
The template or program for picking-up information and
making sense of the world is formed from the basic, future-
oriented nature of movement. The individual-as-agent extends
forward in time through movement, self-generating a world of
actions and contingent perceptual responses. These responses
are appraised as a threat or benefit to the vitality of the
organism, giving a self-related affective valence to each act and it
consequences. Meaning is achieved by moving with assimilation
of contingent sensory stimulation, and with emotion, not by
a passive stimulus-response mechanism of mind, but by the
living creativity of an embodied, psycho-physical organism.
The fundamental narrative form as a self-generated experience,
with the four-part structure of its vitality, (i) ‘introduction,’ (ii)
‘development,’ (iii) ‘climax,’ and (iv) ‘resolution,’ is evident in the
simplest elementary action of the agent to more complex projects
of actions that extend over greater domains of time and space
(Table 1).
Ontological Units of Mind-in-Action and
the Composition of Embodied Narratives
Animal and human movement is integrated in rhythmic and
graceful sequences of discreet units of activity, each with their
own particular goal-orientation, which are coordinated by the
purpose of a higher-order goal or project (Powers, 1973; Condon,
1979; Jeannerod, 1988; Lee, 2009; Trevarthen et al., 2011;
Delafield-Butt and Gangopadhyay, 2013) (Figure 1). Each unit
in the hierarchy of intended action, from unit components
to the whole project, comprises both a physical pole and a
mental one – the act in motor expression, and its attendant
psychological qualities of intention, perceptual guidance, and
affective evaluation. These combine in a deliberate form of
movement appreciated privately or subjectively, and perceptually
available to others intersubjectively (Delafield-Butt, 2014)1.
To approach an environmental goal with an independently
mobile body many action units must be coordinated together
in an intended future (Lashley, 1951; Pezzulo and Castelfranchi,
2009; Pezzulo, 2011; Delafield-Butt and Gangopadhyay, 2013).
Serial organization of action and accommodation of new
possibilities for further action require more complex cognitive
tools of motor planning and associative and episodic memory
of a world of opportunities. The cognitive advances in prenatal
development, evident before neocortical awareness is functional,
are mediated by brainstem and midbrain processes that define
a simple action space regulating movements in a time span of
approximately 1.2–3 s (Table 2). They constitute the beginnings
of conceptual development accumulating motor memories and
associated responses, affects and plans to achieve the goals of
‘projects of activity.’
Serial organization of effective movements by an infant,
requiring ‘action chaining’ in imaginative projects (Fogassi et al.,
2005; Cattaneo et al., 2007) is not well-formed until 9 months
after birth. But the newborn infant is able to coordinate whole
body movement to identify and track an object of interest,
and the basic form of a reach to grasp is already established
(Trevarthen, 1984). The goal-directed, prospective control of
this ‘pre-reaching’ improves rapidly (von Hofsten and Fazel-
Zandy, 1984; von Hofsten, 1991) and by 9 months when the
child is sitting upright and the hands are free to manipulate the
world, a large number of projects with ‘secondary’ intentionality
flourish as the child learns the affordances and delights of
the objects around him (Bruner, 1968). At this age the infant
develops motives to gain others’ interest by gesture with affective
expression, with deliberate attention to the form and direction of
their orientations and gestures (Trevarthen, 1986b).
Every purposeful act, at each stage of development, is
conceived in both embodied space and embodied time. It is
structured by circumstances and directed toward an anticipated
future, even those made in utero. It must (i) initiate toward that
future, (ii) develop in its progression over time and through
space with sensory feedback and adaptive anticipatory response
charged with memories, and (iii) reach its target before (iv)
resolving into a quiet state again, the effects of that action now
1We view consciousness as realized by a purposeful composition of elementary
intentions with knowledge of their individual and collective consequences, chained
into the future with some precision. In defining conscious experience, James
(1890) proposed that awareness, although also apparently fluid and continuous,
is fundamentally atomistic (Sinclair, 2009). The post-Cartesian process ontology
of Whitehead (1929), his “Philosophy of Organism,” helps to make sense of
the agentive, goal-oriented nature of animal action and offers a description of
the mind-body relationship better suited to the nature of embodied cognition
as participatory and generative meaning-making than Platonic or Cartesian
accounts (Delafield-Butt, 2007, 2014; Basile, 2010) with their explanatory gap
(Chalmers, 1995). At the same time, it is compatible with a robust, mechanistic
materialism suitable for scientific enquiry (Strawson, 2006). Langer (1942),
following Whitehead, advanced an artful philosophy, drawing support from the
persuasive power of music. Also concerned with the embodied and inter-subjective
nature of experience, and profoundly relevant for our account of the developing
human mind is the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty (Welsh, 2013).
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TABLE 1 | Units of solitary and social sensorimotor intentionality.
Level Unit type Description Temporal range
Primary, solitary Action unit A single continuous profile of velocity to a goal, obeying ‘tau’ dynamics for ‘gap
closure’ e.g., an arm movement to a point in body-space or to contact an object.
200–1200 ms
Primary, social Shared action unit A single continuous movement to a goal made in shared attention with another – to
sustain mutual gaze, to shared a gesture, or to achieve harmonic concordance in
vocal exchange
Secondary, solitary Immediate, proximal
project -sequence of
actions
Coordination and serial organization of multiple action units for a proximal task – a
reach-to-grasp-and-hold, or a reach-to- grasp-to-eat.
1–3 s
Secondary, social Immediate, proximal
shared project–shared
sequence of actions
Interpersonal coordination and serial organization of multiple action units, achieving
joint conclusion, for, e.g., reciprocal eye gaze and recognition in mutual attention,
e.g., baby looks at mother, mother looks at baby, and smiles
Tertiary, solitary Imagined, distal project –
projects of projects
Coordination and serial organization of immediate acts as part of a project to
complete in the near future, as, for example., a toddler stacking cubes, or playing
with grass and flowers, and developing such tasks as an adult cooking dinner.
More than 3 s, typically
5–15 s for single
mother-to-infant narratives.
Tertiary, social Imagined, shared narrative
-shared projects of
projects
Interpersonal coordination and serial organization of short projects for recall to build
experience, for example as in. infant-adult proto-conversation, games, and rituals.
See Table 2 for the intrinsic timing of actions of adults and infants.
FIGURE 1 | Hierarchical organization of units of intentional sensori-motor action: (1◦) individual ‘action units’ toward immediate goals;
(2◦) proximal projects that structure and coordinate elementary action units; and (3◦) projects of projects. For example, the distal tertiary intention
to ‘make tea’ is accomplished by a sequence of secondary levels of intention; to ‘take tea pot,’ ‘pour water,’ each composed of a sequence of more
proximal sensorimotor actions: (i) reach and (ii) grasp the tea pot, (iii) place into position, and (iv) release; (i) reach and (ii) grasp the kettle, and (iii) pour water
into the tea pot before (iv) returning the kettle to its resting position. Overlapping projects are possible with use of two limbs or others effectors, with
simultaneous action coordinated within a single body for a single practical purpose. Such unitary and embedded organization of practical skill enables a rich
repertoire of possible projects. See also Delafield-Butt and Gangopadhyay (2013).
appropriated into the recollected state of the organism. Each
step carries the organism purposefully in time and space to a
set of relations with new affordances, and new meaning in what
Margaret Donaldson calls the ‘line mode’ of thought (Donaldson,
1992).
Within the hierarchy of action organization (Figure 1;Table 1;
Delafield-Butt and Gangopadhyay, 2013), each level is organized
by its local, prospective goal, in coordination with levels above
and below. The simple ‘action unit’ serves as the basic element
of intentional action, characterized by continuous regulation
of velocity to reach an anticipated future state in self-related
space and time. Hand gesture, pressure change in grasping, oral
movement in speech, a step in walking, etc. are each defined
as closure of an ‘action gap’ (Lee, 2009). Such simple action
units are ‘goal-directed’ and seek closure. They occur first in
early fetal stages and constitute the primary level of sensorimotor
intentionality. In purposeful behavior by a more developed
conscious subject, a sequence of these elements can be serially
organized into a secondary level of a ‘project’ of action units
(Lashley, 1951). A reach-and-grasp or a reach-to-touch is the first
rudimentary project of a forelimb of a fetus. It is composed of two
action units sequentially organized to form one coherent project
with a common goal.
Innate Micro-Kinesics of Communication, and
Emotional Regulation of Projects and Stories
Measurement of motor activities to small fractions of a second
by ‘micro-kinesics’ has demonstrated both the fine coordination
of movements within an individual preforming an activity of
tool use, or of locomotion (Bernstein, 1967), and the delicate
inter-synchrony of utterances and gestures between individuals
in natural conversation or artful performance (Condon and
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Ogston, 1966; Birdwhistell, 1970). This has been applied to prove
the sensitivity of a newborn to the motor impulses of adult
speech – the baby can move its arms to synchronize precisely
with the syllables and phrases, which anticipates learning to speak
(Condon and Sander, 1974; Condon, 1979).
As sensorimotor action planning with cognitive capacities is
mastered in infancy through primary and secondary levels, the
world becomes a place to play with chains of purposes to build
memorable projects. The sequential organization of projects
develops in toddlerhood to enable tertiary ‘projects of projects’
that perform complex and abstract tasks with goals beyond the
present moment in both time and action space (Trevarthen et al.,
2011).
We can trace the development in the first year of infancy
toward projects of practical communication: from primary
intersubjectivity in dialog, through games with expressions,
then games with objects, to secondary intersubjectivity to share
the project of a task using objects (Hubley and Trevarthen,
1979). Halliday (1978) describes stages in the child’s developing
powers of conversation with increasingly complex conventions
of practice: proto-conversation (with expressive ‘pre-speech’),
proto-language (acts of meaning with content), proto-narrative
and dialog (with elementary lexico-grammar), proto-discourse
(intermediate lexico-grammar), proto-turn taking (advanced
lexico-grammar), proto-variation (register and social dialect).
The child’s ‘locus of concern’ in awareness of intentions is
growing with increasing memory, always regulated by feelings
of value and expressed with emotion (Donaldson, 1992). Each
level in prospective control of action is structured within
the intentions specified at higher levels, and conversely the
intentional organization of lower level states motivates and
structures those of higher levels (Figure 1; Table 1).
Each stage of the development of conscious control of
actions is sustained by the affective regulation of ‘vitality
dynamics’ in body movement (Stern, 2010). These arise as sub-
neocortical ‘primary-process emotions’ (Panksepp, 2011) acting
with ‘anoetic’ consciousness (Vandekerckhove and Panksepp,
2011), becoming ‘secondary-process emotions,’ learned and
supported with basal ganglia memories and associations of
moving, then ‘tertiary affects,’ enabled through neocortical
awareness of richer environmental affordances. Maturation
of core brain systems motivates development from primary
sensorimotor units of ‘intention-actions’ to tertiary, abstract
projects of ‘intentions-to-act’ in ‘rational’ ways, each stage being
prospectively controlled to coordinate and direct action in the
‘specious present’ (James, 1890) to achieve the goal in mind
(Pezzulo and Castelfranchi, 2009; Pezzulo, 2011; Delafield-Butt
and Gangopadhyay, 2013). Progress from pre-conceptual to
conceptual cognition elaborates personal phenomenal awareness
from the start of life as the basis for social collaboration
(Tomasello et al., 2005), and education of cultural intelligence
(Trevarthen et al., 2014; Trevarthen and Delafield-Butt, 2015).
Performance of more distal, more ambitious goals requires
serial organization of movement-with-awareness into ‘projects
of projects of action units.’ Enterprises like cooking dinner,
building a tower of blocks, or winning at chess, require
coordinating a number of sub-projects, eachwith their own goals.
Such achievements of creative practical and social action must
be conceived within an imaginative ‘present moment’ drawing
on memories of past skills as it looks to achieve a desired future
(Stern, 2004).
When babies become toddlers and are able to master a rich
repertoire of projects, they take delight in mimicking the complex
projects of adults, learning the styles and patterns of a culture.
Cooking dinner is one such project, and the children’s play
kitchen is always a favorite in the nursery classroom. Nursery
children aged 2–4 take special joy in cooking and preparing
dinner with toy utensils and foods, organizing the projects of
grasping, cutting, mixing, and so on into larger structures with
higher intentional perspective. Over the next years their motor
and cognitive precision will improve to allow them to do just
that, replacing toys for the genuine article. From two to five
the child takes up and transforms words to recount ingenious
understanding of purposes and experiences (Chukovsky, 1968).
Social Learning, from Narratives of
Communicative Musicality to Language
Young children join in the rituals of the day (Frank
and Trevarthen, 2012), showing special interest in social
engagements that incorporate the rhythms and song of dance
and music, even after they go to school for more formal
instruction (Erickson, 2009). Bruner (1996, p. ix) remarks
that “. . .schooling is only one small part of how a culture
inducts the young into its canonical ways.” Social learning
is innate, embodied experience shared naturally in cultures
of families and community animated by the ‘human sense’
(Donaldson, 1978) of the ‘the muse within’ (Bjørkvold, 1992),
its narratives regulated with hierarchical rhythmic structures
of moving emotionally with ‘communicative musicality’
(Malloch, 1999; Malloch and Trevarthen, 2009; Mazokopaki
and Kugiumutzakis, 2009; Panksepp and Trevarthen, 2009),
communicating emotional feelings of the self (Stern, 1993,
2000).
“Narratives of individual experience and of companionship
are built from the units of pulse and quality found in the
jointly created gestures of vocalizations and bodily movement.
Narratives are the very essence of human companionship and
communication. Narratives allow two persons to share a sense
of passing time, and to create and share the emotional envelopes
that evolve through this shared time. They express innate motives
for sharing emotion and experience with other persons and for
creating meaning in joint activity with others”
(Malloch, 1999, p. 45).
Protoconversations and baby songs from many different
languages all show the four-part organization in dialogs,
verses or stanzas of between 20 and 50 s in length, with
modulation of rhythms and expression to compose introduction,
development, climax, and resolution, with rhyming vowels at
key points, to all of which the infants engage with anticipation
(Malloch, 1999; Trevarthen, 1999, 2008; Powers and Trevarthen,
2009).
A human full term newborn, adapted for new experiences in
a human community, is sensitively responsive to the dynamic
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impulses of another person – by body contact, sight of the eyes
face and hands, the sounds of speech, and gentle touching, and
he or she can recognize the mother’s voice (Condon and Sander,
1974; Brazelton, 1979; Nagy, 2011). If calm and alert after the
transition to a very different environment, the newborn may
contribute to a precisely timed imitative exchange of expressions
and pauses with another person, a dialog of movements that
evolves as an emotional event lasting a few seconds (Trevarthen,
1999; Kugiumutzakis and Trevarthen, 2015). It is clear that
newborn infants hear the beat of human life in movement
(Winkler et al., 2009). They move to the rhythms of music
(Zentner and Eerola, 2010), co-regulating their impulses in poetic
episodes of shared experience.
Human exchanges of purposes and feelings are mediated
by motor signals of a complexity not possessed by any other
primates – of the head, the eyes, the face, the vocal system, the
hands, and the whole body, all active in well-ordered sequences
from birth, and all conspicuously shaped to make signals that
another human being will appreciate (Trevarthen, 1978, 2012).
The movements are synchronized to express a contour of
energy showing of a ‘regulatory tide of vitality’ (Figure 2), the
rhythm of which relates to autonomic or visceral processes
that give the internal ‘psychic time’ (Table 2) of an integrated
Self to arousal of sequences of cognitive elements, intentional
acts, and the affective, interpersonal power of expressions in
communication (Delamont et al., 1999; Keltner, 2003; Wittmann,
2009; Meissner and Wittmann, 2011). The movements are
intricately ordered with prospective sensory control common
to all organisms (Trevarthen et al., 2011; Delafield-Butt et al.,
2012).
Within the first 2 months, developments in the alertness and
focus of the infant’s attention to human signals, especially for
finding and keeping eye-to-eye contact and precise synchrony
with vocal and manual expressions, encourages a parent to
share dialogs described as ‘proto-conversations’ (Bateson, 1979).
Expressions of intention, awareness, and feelings are passed
between infant and parent in ‘proto-narrative envelopes’ of
vitality (Stern, 1999, 2010), with an evolving shape as celebrations
FIGURE 2 | Narrative intensity contour of impulses to move in the time
of a narrative over its four phases. (i) ‘Interest’ in the narrative begins at a
low-intensity in the introduction, which ‘invites’ participation in
purposefulness; (ii) the coordination of the actions and interests of real and
imagined agents intensifies over the development, as the ‘plan’ or ‘project’ is
developed; (iii) a peak of excitation with achievement of a goal in mutual
intention is reached at the climax; after which (iv) the intensity reduces as the
purposes of the participants share a resolution, and those who were closely
engaged, separate. From Trevarthen and Delafield-Butt (2013a).
in gesture and vocalization (Trevarthen, 1980, 1990). Groups
of infants less than 1 month old with no adults present can
indulge in similar dramas of vocal and gestural display (Bradley,
2009). These are semiotic events of imaginative movement,
which, months later, develop into stories told in the melodies
of song (Bjørkvold, 1992; Malloch and Trevarthen, 2009),
and elaborate forms of language (Halliday, 1978; Rommetveit,
1998). We are born to be ‘story-making creatures’ (Bruner,
1990). And stories are born of the motor logic of agent
movements seeking vital purpose (Delafield-Butt and Trevarthen,
2013).
Episodes of dramatic or more aroused action, of speaking in
conversation, or of music, appear to be essential in the emotional
regulation of all forms of movement (Damasio, 1999) and to
all forms of inter-subjective co-creation of meaning in dyadic
states of human consciousness (Trevarthen, 2005; Tronick, 2005).
They make predictable patterns of engagement, and lead to
mutual ‘sympathetic’ involvement in vocal andmotor expressions
of changes in feeling. As Adam Smith said of music in his
remarkable essay on The Imitative Arts: “Time and measure are
to instrumental Music what order and method are to discourse;
they break it into proper parts and divisions, by which we are
enabled both to remember better what has gone before, and
frequently to foresee somewhat of what is to come after:.... the
enjoyment of Music arises partly from memory and partly from
foresight.” (Smith, 1777/1982, p. 204). Imagined worlds of art
and reason, with their emotional appreciation, are built out of
the times experienced in familiar episodes of expressive behavior,
the vitality contours of which may be anticipated, recalled, and
shared with companions.
We trace the intensity contour of energy in movement
over four phases of a message or shared performance: in
the introduction attentive expressions ‘invite’ participation in
purposefulness; the first response from a real or imagined
partner provokes the development of the ‘project,’ until a
peak of coincident excitation in mutual intention is reached
at the climax, after which the intensity of expectation and
effort reduces in a resolution. Then those who were closely
engaged, separate, or engage in a new narrative process, co-
creating new meanings and revisiting old ones. The pattern of
rise and fall in excitement and effort may also be found in
the semiotic rituals of animals (Tinbergen, 1951; Sebeok, 1972,
1994).
A narrative’s nature exists in its internal dimensions of
feeling and form as well as in its rhythmic, shared, and co-
created form between two or more persons, “There are certain
aspects of the so-called ‘inner life’—physical or mental—which
have formal properties similar to those of music— patterns
of motion and rest, of tension and release, of agreement
and disagreement, preparation, fulfillment, excitation, sudden
change, etc.,” (Langer, 1942, p. 228, quoted by Kühl, 2007,
p. 223). Co-created narrative engagement gives structure to
intersubjective episodes making discreet parcels of interaction
with definitive opening and conclusions, as a solo sensorimotor
project does. Its musical nature further functions to “enhance. . .
the quality of individual experience and human relationships;
its structures are reflections of patterns of human relations”
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(Blacking, 1969/1995, p. 31). The musicality of narrative “is
inseparable from its value as expressions of human experience.”
(ibid.).
When the narrative is finished, the experience of its creation
will remain with each of the partners, and between them
they may hold its special memory – a memory of a unique,
shared experience, the co-creation of which imbues the memory
with ‘meaning.’ The conclusion of a narrative episode is
followed by a disengagement, which allows the two partners to
consider renewing their mutual focus, ready to begin building
a new narrative cycle, or they may separate. Read and Miller
(1995, p. 143), social psychologists, consider narratives to be
“universally basic to conversation and meaning making.” They
can be regarded as the essential foundation for consciousness
in a more elaborate purposeful social life, among animals,
for infants, and for older human beings who have mastered
language (Dautenhahn, 2002). Narratives do not have to be
linguistic. Understanding the pre-verbal origins of narrative is
fundamental for understanding human cognition and culture,
and demands multidisciplinary investigation (Bullowa, 1979;
Cobley, 2014).
The Life Time of an Early Embodied
Narrative: an Intimate Illustration
We illustrate the primary psychological events and their synthesis
to generate mutual interest, shared excitement, and reflective
satisfaction with a micro-analysis of a 30 second dialog between
a premature newborn and his affectionate mother. Many
forms of expressive movement are displayed, intersubjective
contact being mediated by complementary modalities of voice
and gesture. The two human beings compensate for their
very different levels of development in intimate collaboration,
the mother coming close to her infant in rhythm and
sympathy with musical intonation of her speech, and the infant
animating his feelings in seductive ways in response to her
encouragements.
Baby B, was born prematurely at 27 weeks gestational age
with his monozygotic twin brother. The boys received intensive
care in the hospital neonatal unit, and their mother visited every
day for sessions of body to body ‘kangaroo’ care and for social
support. When the recording was made, the mother and her
infants had been in hospital for 8 weeks with regular opportunity
for interaction, and B was at 34–36 weeks before term. Both
babies were due for discharge that week and their health was
considered stable.
B was lying on a quilted tabletop with his mother seated
in a chair at his feet, leaning over him. An overhead video
camera provided a vertical view of B (Figure 3), and a
second camera recorded a frontal view of his mother. Their
vocalizations (Figure 4) were recorded by two microphones. B’s
arm movements were tracked by attaching a reflective marker to
his wrists. A six-camera motion capture system (Proreflex 500,
Qualisys) recorded in 3D the coordinate position of the markers
500 times per second, with a spatial resolution of less than
1 mm. Displacements of his left and right wrists were recorded
as tangential velocity or speed, disregarding direction of travel
(Figure 4).
B was intubated from birth to assist his breathing, which
made vocalizations difficult. When recorded he was oxygenated
by a nasal cannula. Medical physiological measures were taken
continuously to monitor heart rate and blood oxygenation.
A warning sound alerted his mother when these levels dropped
below thresholds set on the monitor standing to her right and
behind her.
At first, B was sleeping quietly, and his mother was asked
to try to wake him and to keep him alert, but calm. The 30 s
sample of their communication, starting from the moment he
began to respond, illustrates how, by sympathetic attention and
affectionate speech, she invited and responded to B in intimate
dialog, building from his active expressions of attention to
her a narrative episode of engagement. She was following his
expressions of interest or enthusiasm, and it may be said that
B was the main ‘composer’ or ‘author’ of this story, animating
its beginning and drawing it to conclusion with his actions.
The mother invited him then followed his animation and
willingness ‘play the game’ with her. Their mutual interest in
the ‘dialog’ was sustained by the ‘attunement’ of the rhythmic
vocal invitations of the mother (Stern, 2000), with occasional
touches by her gesturing right hand, and by the eagerness of
the infant to respond with expressive body movements, hand
gestures, attentive looking, smiles, and vocalizations (Trevarthen,
1990). The photographs in Figure 3 record events in the
infant’s participation with certain of the mother’s expressions.
They demonstrate the precise inter-synchrony of their complex
behaviors. The mother’s speech and non-verbal vocal expressions
and B’s arm movements, smiles and attempts at vocalization
are shown in Figure 4. Photographs of Figure 3 are indicated
by their letters, and the mother’s utterances are printed in
italics.
Introduction, 0–9 s
In the first 3 s (A,B) the baby, who had been asleep, is stirring
gently as his mother attempts to arouse him, saying, “Are you
woken up Mister?” He turns sleepily with eyes closed, to face her
(B). His left hand is held shut by his head and his right hand
is lying back on the bed, open. He makes a small vocalization
just before she says, “Good afternoon!” She makes a gesture to
touch his side with her right index finger then points to her
mouth in rhythmic synchrony with speech before laying her hand
gently on the bed beside him. B closes his mouth with his tongue
between his lips, then turns away, making a sleepy jerk to face
his right hand, with eyes closed. His left hand makes a rapid
movement up and to the right to follow the head, and his right
hand moves up a little the fingers opening as his mother starts
to say, “Good afternoon, wee B” and she turns left to face him,
placing her right index beside B. His right hand opens and shuts
synchronously with the word “B” – he is listening (C). At 7 s
as his mother says “How are you doin?”, B’s right hand moves
slightly forward, closes index then opens and closes again gently,
again in synchrony with her speech (D). She withdraws the right
index as she says “Eh?”, as her voice rises, B smiles and his right
hand shuts. He is clearly listening and shadowing his mother’s
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FIGURE 3 | Baby B’s expressive actions at different moments in interaction with his mother. The columns correspond to the four phases of a
narrative of purposes and experiences supported by the vocalizations of his mother numbered in Figure 4. After a period of intense, pleasurable
self-expression, with his mother’s happy participation, B withdraws, and his mother attempts to provoke new engagement by ‘teasing’ or ‘joking’ about his
behaviors. See detailed description in the text.
speaking with his right hand, and signaling his appreciation with
a smile.
Development, 10–17 s
Still smiling, B makes a small vocalization at 10 s (E) His mouth
opens and then shuts quickly as his mother says “Oorh, look at
that big smile!” with a cheerful teasing expression of pleasure,
and she pulls her head back and touches the bed with her right
index. B may be swallowing after the attempt to vocalize. After
smiling, he pauses a moment. His mother turns right to look at
the monitor behind her to check his physiological indices and
says, to herself, with different intonation, “Oh, that’s all great!”
B reaches up with his right hand and opens his eyes in synchrony
with this phrase (F), then as she pronounces the word “great” he
makes a chewing movement and looks toward his hand. At 15 s
his right hand opens and closes and his wrist turns out away from
his face (G). He may be feeling the mattress with the back of his
hand. His mother touches him to tickle his thigh gently, and then
as she says to him, with lift of intonation, “Look at that big smile!”
her index goes down to touch the blanket. B’s right hand waves
back to touch the bed, then is pulled in his cheek. He smiles and
his eyes close in rhythm with the mother’s speech, then they open
at 17 s (H).
Climax, 18–22 s
As B’s mother says “Hi-ya,” he stretches his head up to look
forward, turning his right hand back at the wrist in a waving
gesture, opens his mouth wide, and smiles (I). Then he turns
quickly to face his mother, vocalizes with a rough sound and
gestures, smiling and grimacing with the effort. At 19–20 s when
his mother says, “Hello there!”, both his hands are pulled up, back
and out in a big rowing gesture (J,K). As mother’s voice glides
dramatically down through an octave from C5 to C4 between 20
and 21 s, B opens his mouth very wide and closes it with a smile
in synchrony with fast forward and back down and pulled back
rowing movements of his two hands. His eyes open and he coughs
at 20 s (L). At 22 s B makes a second rowing cycle and his mouth
shuts. As his mother finishes the vocal glide and turns to her right,
his hands are at his shoulders and his tongue is visible in an open
mouth.
Resolution, 23–30 s
At 23 s, having finished his display of excitement and delight,
shared intimately in rhythm with his mother’s speaking, B pulls
his hands in and turns away from his mother, eyes half closed,
mouth half open and shutting with tongue visible as she says with
a deep ironic tone “Oh, you’re kicking your Mum!” (B is pushing
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FIGURE 4 | Sounds recorded through the 30 s dialog with Baby B, and his arm movements, smiles and attempts to vocalize. Along the top, the locations
of the photographs shown in Figure 3 are shown by letters A–P. Below is a transcription of the mother’s speech and vocal expression. The utterances are numbered
and identified in the pitch plot above. The baby’s vocalisations are indicated with a circle, they do not always register on the pitch plot. Photographs N, O, and P, and
utterances 13, 14, and 15 cover the final period when the infant is not engaged with his mother’s expressions, and her speech indicates she is provoking him, or
joking about his actions. He repeats the arm movements he made at the ‘climax,’ as a ‘coda.’
his foot against his mother’s stomach). He turns his head up, and
with the word “Mum!” (M), his eyes close and his right hand goes
up, opens and moves slowly out, then his eyes open to look at his
hand. His mouth is half open with the tongue visible. His mother
glances to her right to the monitor as she says “Mum!”, then
she turns back and gives a little tickle to his side with her right
index, saying, “Are you kickin’ me?” (N). At 26 s B clasps his right
hand quietly and moves it down as his mouth opens. His mother
says, “Eh?” (O). A moment later, at 29 s, B turns back to face his
mother, his mouth opens wide and his eyes close. His left hand is
up beside his face and his right hand is back and half closed, with
index extended and his tongue protruded in a wide-open mouth
(P). His mother responds with a vigorous teasing at low pitch,
“Have a big wriggle, then.” In these last 5 s (N,O,P) B has become
active, but he is performing with little sign of awareness of his
mother, or her playful actions. He appears to be disengaged from
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her and perhaps is recollecting his excitement of 10 s previously
(I,J,K,L) in a ‘coda.’ He does not smile or vocalize.
Summary
B displayed his awakening experience of his mother’s voice
and touches by becoming still, to listen. And then he slowly
began a story of self-aware movements that harmonized with her
repeating calls of speech, turning his head, gesturing expressively
with his hands, making subtle movements with his mouth,
holding his right hand up and looking at it, recognizing his
mother’s encouragements with smiles and attempts to vocalize.
He became a collaborator, linking his increasing interest and
effort at self-expression to his mother’s responses, gaining fluency
and vigor in synchrony with her rhythms until he excited both of
them with big cyclic movements of both arms together and wide
open mouth with effort to vocalize. His mother’s dramatic pitch
glide shared this triumph and brought their shared excitement to
a close. And then he withdrew and rested before making some
movements for his own pleasure, which show little attention to
his mother’s observations about what he was doing. Altogether
they traced a narrative form of arousal, affect, and intention with
its four distinct phases, co-creating its ‘story.’
Generating Narrative Patterns of Meaning in
Learning and Memory
B’s shared narrative with his mother appears to have become
an object in his memory, holding a process of learned meaning
composed with evolving affective value and patterns of self- and
other-regulation of arousal, interest, and intentions expressed
in the form and qualities of body movement. He repeats this
pattern in the short coda after the event, recalling the embodied,
shared schema of feeling in action and expression. This object
now held in his memory becomes available for future events,
setting a template of possible action with its expectations of affect-
laden social interest and intention from the others, as well as
its preparatory autonomic anticipations (Schore, 2000). This is
how his attachment with his mother, and their shared, intimate
understanding, grows (Powers and Trevarthen, 2009; Porges and
Furman, 2011; Narvaez et al., 2013).
Human Being in Movement and the
Making of Meaning, in Learning, and in
Therapy
The story made by Baby B and his mother demonstrates the
dual aspect of narrative as embodied in physical and emotional
experience of the actor, and as a semiotic experience for
consensual understanding. Mother and baby shared a human
‘tide of vitality’ in arousal, interest and expression over the
four-part structure of what Stern (1995) calls a ‘proto-narrative
envelope.’ The mother elaborates this in a verbal story-making,
making sense in her own language of the rise and fall of vital
interest and pleasurable feeling they share. Together, their bodies
give form and energy to a tide of meaning sensed in many
modalities, on which her verbal language can ride.
All narratives are rooted and expressed in body movement, for
communication. Human cultural narratives, beginning in proto-
conversations and the rituals of games with infants (Merker,
2009), become habitual sources of collaborative activity between
people who know each other well. In enduring relationships
productive interactions pick up themes from earlier narratives,
thus developing a memory or ‘habitus’ of engagement that
builds cultural meanings of ritual and belief, in art and industry
in a ‘sociosphere’ of knowledge (Bourdieu, 1990; Frank and
Trevarthen, 2012). The ritualized games enjoyed between an
infant and a mother or other loving companion strengthen their
affection and give them a sense of meaningful ‘belonging.’ They
create a ‘proto-habitus,’ an early ‘living in belonging’ (Gratier and
Trevarthen, 2008).
The theory of the prospective organization of embodied
narrative in interpersonal meaning-making is supported by
evidence of disruption in the prospective timing and affective
integration of motor intentions in individuals with socio-
emotional disorder. For example, errors in sensorimotor
capacity to efficiently enact desired intentions characterize
autism spectrum disorders, regularly thwarting success, creating
distress and isolation, and consequent social and emotional
compensations (Trevarthen and Aitken, 2001; Trevarthen et al.,
2006; St Claire et al., 2007; Trevarthen and Delafield-Butt, 2013b).
When rhythms of shared narrative become disrupted, causing
social misunderstanding and anxious or defensive reactions,
therapy for emotional illness or autism can benefit from
understanding of core intentional and affective dynamics and
their regulation by sharing imitative and creative projects, which
may employ non-verbal forms of expressive movement as in
dance, music, and drama.
Conclusion
In this paper we trace the origin of narrative form in
communication to a primary motivation for conscious
understanding enacted and structured through purposeful
movement. These lively self-generated engagements with
awareness of the world place events in a time and space of
vital meaning for the embodied experience of the Self, as well
as for communication with other persons. The form of this
generative process is found to be invariant across development,
from the simple motor capacities of the young fetus through
pre-verbal proto-conversation in infancy, and into linguistic
meaning-making in childhood and later human life.
Meaning-making in movement and its co-creation in dialog
arise within a basic, four-part organization common to all levels
in the embodied action of a purposeful agent, with (i) an initiation
seeking a goal, (ii) a development in the strategy of its progression,
usually through repeated cycles of ‘testing’ by expression and
adaptation until, (iii) a climax of excitation and achievement is
attained, before (iv) that particular plan of action comes to an
end, or resolution, and the direction of interest changes.
We have shown how the future-oriented, generative and
rhythmic structure of the human will-to-move is organized
from the start by the psycho-motor dynamics of an articulated,
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hypermobile body together with its internal self-preserving,
visceral autonomic rhythms, that is, with purpose and with
emotion. The coordinated temporal patterns of action and vitality
of the Self-As-Agent structure forms of effort that generate
meaningful concern for the individual as he or she, in solitary
or in social projects patterned over many seconds, tens of
seconds, minutes, and hours, engages with a world of objects
and people. The rhythms of engagement expand in scope and
ambition as the imagination of adult life envisages years of
achievement and understanding that will be stored and named
as beliefs, rituals, and techniques. Thus life stories with their
intrinsic narrative vitality create a store of experience, memories,
understanding and purpose – the culture of a cooperative
society.
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